@article{106001,
  keywords = {bargaining, contracting externalities, political economy, vote buying, delay},
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros},
  title = {Collective Hold-Up},
  abstract = {<p>We consider a dynamic process of coalition formation in which a principal bargains sequentially with a group of \&nbsp;agents. This problem is at the core of a variety of applications in economics and politics, including a lobbyist seeking to pass a bill, an entrepreneur setting up a start-up, or a firm seeking the approval of corrupt bureaucrats. We show that when the principal{\textquoteright}s willingness to pay is high, reallocating bargaining power from the principal to the agents generates delay and reduces agents{\textquoteright} welfare. This occurs in spite of the lack of \&nbsp;informational asymmetries or discriminatory offers. When this collective action problem is severe enough, agents prefer to give up considerable bargaining power in favor of the principal.</p>
},
  year = {2023},
  journal = {Theoretical Economics},
  volume = {18},
  chapter = {1063},
  pages = {1063-1100},
  month = {07/2023},
  language = {eng},
}