@misc{175681,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Gabriel Moctezuma and Paola Moscariello},
  title = {Career Concerns in Collective Decision-Making: The Federal Open Market Committee},
  abstract = {<p>In this paper, we quantify the distortions induced by career concerns within the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). We combine a structural approach with an unanticipated change in the information available to the public about internal committee deliberations. We show that -- given the policy preferences of Fed Presidents and Board Governors serving in the FOMC -- agents{\textquoteright} incentives to appear competent and unbiased outweigh the distortions induced by anti-pandering and conformity. Relative to a counterfactual with no reputational considerations, career concerns improve the welfare of an unbiased principal. Given our estimates of career concerns, \&nbsp;Transparency improves welfare relative to an Opaque regime in which internal deliberations are not made public. In a counterfactual exercise, we show that greater heterogeneity in regional shocks reduces conformity but increases policy errors under Transparency.</p>},
  year = {2025},
}