@article{27906,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower},
  title = {Contestable Leadership: Party Leaders as Principals and Agents},
  abstract = { <p>This paper examines the institutional determinants of discipline in legislative parties.~The model formalizes the tradeoff between resources at the leader{\textquoteright}s discretion,~and the leader{\textquoteright}s need to maintain a minimum level of support to continue leading.~The value of the leader{\textquoteright}s promises of future benefits is here endogenously determined~by the backbenchers{\textquoteright} beliefs about the extent of support to the leader among~other party legislators. Rewards that can be distributed publicly and on the spot are~effective tools to coordinate beliefs about the stability of the leader, and thus also~increase the value of the leader{\textquoteright}s promises of future benefits. These spot resources~are in fact necessary for the leader to be powerful: without them, the leader can~use promises of future benefits to sway members{\textquoteright} behavior only if a majority of the~party agrees (ex ante) with the leader{\textquoteright}s preferred position in the first place.</p> },
  year = {2008},
  journal = {Quarterly Journal of Political Science},
  volume = {3},
  number = {3},
  pages = {203-225},
  language = {eng},
}