@article{27926,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi},
  title = {Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation},
  abstract = {<p>This paper links the theory of interest groups influence over the legislature with that of congressional\&nbsp;control over the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying\&nbsp;with the negative available evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds\&nbsp;light to the determinants of lobbying in separation-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial\&nbsp;decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls the more divided the legislature\&nbsp;is on the relevant issues. We apply this framework to analyze supreme court labor decisions in Argentina,\&nbsp;and find results consistent with the predictions of the theory.</p>
},
  year = {2006},
  journal = {American Political Science Review},
  volume = {100},
  pages = {85{\textendash}97},
  language = {eng},
}