@article{27966,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros},
  title = {Power Brokers: Middlemen in Legislative Bargaining},
  abstract = {<p>We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining with policy externalities.\&nbsp;We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust\&nbsp;equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy\&nbsp;outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman{\textquoteright}s policy\&nbsp;preferences and bargaining position must be such to make his role of intermediary\&nbsp;credible. But the middleman must also directly benefit from policy change. Thus,\&nbsp;the political broker is both an intermediary and a client. This result highlights a\&nbsp;fundamental difference between intermediaries in politics and exchange economies.</p>
},
  year = {2016},
  journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
  volume = {162},
  pages = {209-236},
  language = {eng},
}