@article{27971,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Santiago Oliveros},
  title = {Competing for Loyalty: The Dynamics of Rallying Support},
  abstract = {<p>We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a\&nbsp;single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a\&nbsp;group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents{\textquoteright} decisions\&nbsp;to support an alternative are irreversible, and agents negotiate and commit their\&nbsp;support to the principal sequentially. A danger for the agents in this context is that\&nbsp;a principal may be able to poach agents to her side by exploiting competition among\&nbsp;members of the group. Would agents benet from introducing competition between\&nbsp;opposing principals? We show that when the principals{\textquoteright} policies provide value to\&nbsp;the agents, competition generally reduces agents{\textquoteright} welfare. We study applications to\&nbsp;endorsements in elections and corporate takeovers.</p>
},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {The American Economic Review},
  volume = {107},
  pages = {2990-3005},
  language = {eng},
}