@article{27976,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Matthew Shum},
  title = {The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, Keep it Tight},
  abstract = {<p>We estimate an equilibrium model of decision making in the US\&nbsp;Supreme Court that takes into account both private information\&nbsp;and ideological differences between justices. We measure the value\&nbsp;of information in the court by the probability that a justice votes\&nbsp;differently from how she would have voted without case-specific\&nbsp;information. Our results suggest a sizable value of information: in\&nbsp;44 percent of cases, justices{\textquoteright} initial leanings are changed by their\&nbsp;personal assessments of the case. Our results also confirm the\&nbsp;increased politicization of the Supreme Court in the last quarter\&nbsp;century. Counterfactual simulations provide implications for institutional\&nbsp;design.</p>
},
  year = {2012},
  journal = {American Economic Review},
  volume = {102},
  pages = {202-237},
  language = {eng},
}