@article{27986,
  author = {Matias Iaryczower and Gabriel Katz and Sebastian Saiegh},
  title = {Voting in the Bicameral Congress: Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality},
  abstract = {<p>We estimate a model of voting in Congress that allows for dispersed information\&nbsp;about the quality of proposals in an equilibrium context. In equilibrium, the\&nbsp;Senate only approves House bills that receive the support of a supermajority\&nbsp;of members of the lower chamber. We estimate this endogenous supermajority\&nbsp;rule to be about four-fifths on average across policy areas. Our results indicate\&nbsp;that the value of information dispersed among legislators is significant, and that\&nbsp;in equilibrium a large fraction of House members{\textquoteright} (40{\textendash}50\%) votes following their\&nbsp;private information. Finally, we show that the probability of a type I error in\&nbsp;Congress (not passing a good bill) is on average about twice as high as the\&nbsp;probability of a type II error (passing a low-quality bill).</p>
},
  year = {2013},
  journal = {Journal of Law, Economics and Organization},
  volume = {29},
  number = {5},
  pages = {957-991},
  language = {eng},
}