Summary. This course builds on POL 575, to further develop the analytical foundations for examining problems in collective choice. Topics include vote buying, multilateral bargaining, strategic information transmission, strategic voting with incomplete information, career concerns, and strategic experimentation. Readings combine textbooks and research literature. Prerequisite: POL 575.

Contact Information & Logistics. Instructor: Matias Iaryczower, 040 Corwin Hall, email: miaryc@princeton.edu. Class meets M-W 9 am - 10:30 am, location: Corwin 127. I will have office hours Mondays from 2:30 to 4pm. There is no single textbook for the course, but there are several great options. If you want to buy an advanced game theory textbook, I would recommend “Game Theory”, by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. “Game Theory”, by Roger Myerson, and “A Course in Game Theory”, by Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein are also great books, and particularly insightful in certain topics (e.g., Myerson’s presentation of sequential equilibrium, communication, cooperative games, and others). For a more introductory level, see “An Introduction to Game Theory”, by Martin Osborne or “Political Game Theory”, by McCarty and Meirowitz. (We will be in-between these levels throughout the course.) Finally, see “Positive Political Theory” books (in particular PPT II) by Austen-Smith and Banks, for formal positive political theory.

Course Requirements and Grades. Grades are based on the following weighting scheme: Assignments (40%), Final Exam (30%), Presentations (30%). Examinations are “closed-book”, due at the time and place specified on the exam. Collaboration on the examinations is prohibited. Students can work together on assignments - and indeed are encouraged to do so - but the final answers must be written independently. Late assignments will not be accepted, unless for a valid (documented) medical reason. The date that an assignment is due will be announced in lecture when the assignment is distributed. Assignments will be due in class at the start of the lecture on the day they are due. If there is any ambiguity in these policies, it is your responsibility to get clarification from me.

Outline. The focus of the course will be on game theory and its applications to politics, without a particular emphasis on field. Throughout the course, we will cover part of the
following papers/chapters to illustrate applications of the theory to address political problems (papers with a (+) sign to be included if time allows):

I. Static Games of Complete Information.


II. Dynamic Games of Complete Information.


3. **Bargaining.** Austen-Smith and Banks PPT II Ch. 6.


9. **Repeated Games.** Basic Concepts in Repeated Games.
III. Static Games of Incomplete Information.


IV. Introduction to Mechanism Design.

1. **Mechanism Design.** Fudenberg and Tirole Book, Ch.7. (7.2, 7.3, 7.4.3, 7.4.4).


V. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information.


